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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JACK A. MILLIGAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

MELVIN COY HARWARD,
KENNETH B. McDUFFY,
and C. E. LINDSEY,

Case No. 9121

Defendants and Respondents

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
To conform to the Preliminary Statement of the Appellant, throughout this brief plaintiff and appellant will
be referred to as plaintiff, and defendants and respondents
will be referred to as defendants. Further, all references
are to the page numbers of the transcript of the trial and
will be designated as ccTr." rather than to the renumbered
pages of the record.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO
SUPPO,RT A VERDICT AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, McDUFFY AND LINDSEY.
POINT II.
THE PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF
RIDING WITH THE DRIVER HARWARD.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO
SUPPORT A VERDICT AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, McDUFFY AND LINDSEY.
Exhibit uA," a photograph of a drawing on a blackboard, contained in plaintiff's brief, was never introduced
in evidence and is not part of the record in this case. This
drawing on the blackboard was used only for illustrative
purposes. The testimony of Officer Iba, upon which the
drawing is based so far as it relates to any measurements,
was stricken from the record. Upon motion duly made by
counsel for the defendants, McDuffy and Lindsey, the
Court struck all testimony of measurements from the
record.
((MR. AADNESEN: First, your Honor has
under advisement the motion that we made previously to strike the testimony of Officer Iba as it
relates
to the measurements which were made by
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others, and we think that that motion should be
considered now.
((As your Honor will recall, he testified he
did not make them; all he did was write them down.
And on that basis, they are hearsay, no opportunity
for us to cross-examine the officer as to the manner
in which he made them, and his acts.
((THE COURT: Well, the testimony as those
measurements are strictly hearsay. The witness
couldn't even say who it was that told him the distances, nor when or where. So that may be stricken." (Tr. 198)
Plaintiff's counsel does not challenge this ruling in his
brief nor on this appeal.
Officer Iba also testified that the truck was properly
parked.
((A. Well, I don't remember what the measurements was to the truck tires, but the truck was
parked all right. I mean, as far as I can see, and I
had the opinion of officers that the truck was possibly parked all right."

((Q. Well, you have measured that littleCould we do this fairly, and say that right along
here (indicating)((A. Is the gutter.

((Q. (Continuing) -is the gutter. And would
it be fair to assume, from your observations and
what you saw, that the right wheels of that truck
were on that portion, near the curb?
((A. Well, I wouldn't want to say. But I am
satisfied in my own mind the truck was parked all
right.
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uQ. Well, if it had been parked farther out
than that, you would have noticed it, wouldn't
you?
nA. Yes." (Tr. 26)
nA. No. As I recall, the truck was parked all
right. I meanuQ. Otherwise, you said you'd have said something about it, wouldn't you?
uA. Possibly." (Tr. 27)

* :!·

:!· ::-

uA. I don't know actually what it is, but I
imagine there would be 1 0 feet wider than the
other two. Because any time a car stops and parks
against that curb, it becames a parallel parking.
And if there's no traffic there, why, they do use it
as a traffic lane. Rather, I meanceQ. Well, as a matter of fact, it's wide enough,
that with a vehicle parked therenA. With a car there, you could still use it as
a traffic lane.
nQ. They can still use that lane, can't they? So
in actuality, there were three traveled lanes, plus a
parking lane, even though the parking lane itself,
to the extreme right, is not marked.
nA. That's right. There's no markings on the
road itself.
ceQ. When you observed the position of this
car, as a matter of fact, Officer, that evening, and
from that truck, it's a fact, isn't it, that the car in
which the plaintiff was riding could have gone past
this (indicating) and still stayed in that lane?
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ccA. There was plenty a room, yes, sir." (Tr.
28-29)

Further, as the plaintiff points out in his brief, the
right front of the automobile struck the left rear of the
truck and the point of impact was barely a fraction of
inches and had the driver of the automobile been a few
inches further out in the street he would have missed the
truck. The automobile was traveling north on State Street
and the truck was par ked on the east side of the street.
Officer Iba pointed out that even the plaintiff's car, which
was located to the left rear and west of the truck after
impact, was not in the traveled portion of the road.

uQ. When you first saw the cars that were involved-and I understand there won't be any question but what there was the Harward automobile
and the truck of Mr. Lindsey-what was the position of the Harward automobile; where, in relation to the traveled portion of the highway?
uA. The Harward car was cocked to one side.
I mean, it wasn't directly straight into the back end
of the truck; it was cocked to one side, like it had
shifted after the impact.
ceQ. was it in the traveled portion of the highway, the Harward car?
uA. No, it was over, I imagine a little further
to the east." (Tr. 10-11)
We submit that there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever in the record which could support any contention
that the truck was parked in violation of the statute. The
Court graphically summarized this as follows:
uTHE COURT: I listened to the evidence
that's been introduced here very carefully, and
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critically, made rather copious notes on it, and I
cannot find a thing in the record, not a word, that
states or indicates in any way that this truck was
not properly and lawfully parked. That eleven-foot
measurement is not in the record, it's been stricken
because there is no foundation on which to admit
it, and all the other evidence as to the truck, and
mention of it, nowhere is there any-not a word
that I can find in the record, that the truck was not
legally and lawfully parked. I am certain there isn't
a word that it was more than 18 inches from the
curb. There is some evidence that it's closer to the
curb, and parallel to it, and that, in effect, is all the
measurements there is with respect to its position,
except that of Officer Iba, who said it was rightly
and lawfully parked.
uNow if anyone can point out to me any
evidence in the record that shows that truck was not
properly parked, I'd be quite interested in getting it.
((Counsel have anything more?
uMR. MIDGLEY: I have a motion, your
Honor, aside from the one that is made.
(tAre you going to rule on this prior motion at
this time, or should I continue?
uTHE COURT: If you have something you
want to say, you have been silent through the arguments of the rest of them.
uMR. MIDGLEY: On behalf of the Defendant Harward, we can't properly or logically resist
the motion.
uMR. KING: Well, your Honor, I don't know
that the record shows our objection, but we strenuously object to the Court's striking from the
record the measurements by Mr. Iba, in which he

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

participated as a part of a team. And if the Court
does take that evidence out, of course, it knocks
out the basic evidence we feel supports the proposition that the bus, or the truck was not properly
parked.
HMR. AADNESEN: Your Honor, I take it
that my motion is granted at this time?
((THE COURT: Yes, the motion of Mr. McDuffy and Mr. Lindsey, for a dismissal of the action
on the grounds and assertions they included in the
motion, is granted, and the action is dismissed for
want of sufficient evidence to go to the jury or to
the court for any other judgment." (Tr. 198-200)

* * :- *
uNow, all the evidence in regard to that truck
is that it was parked on the side of the road near
the curb, outside of the painted lanes on what is
known as the drainage lane or the gutter lane,
which, by the law, is a parking lane where .cars and
trucks may be parked.
((The evidence is that this truck was so par ked,
and within all the requirements of the statute; that
it was while the car was so parked that the other
car crashed into the back of it, which resulted in the
damages done. But there is no evidence in the record
from which a conclusion could be reached or found
that there's anything in .connection with the truck,
or the owners thereof, which in any way contributed to this accident. So there being no such thing
for the jury to hunt for, and work at, there is
nothing and no reason for sending the jury out to
deliberate on something on which there is no evidence or claim." (Tr. 202)
Contrary to the testimony of the defendant Harward,
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ing on the truck at the time he arrived at the scene of
accident after it occurred. This becomes unimportant
cause all of the testimony in the case indicates that
vehicle could be seen beyond a distance of 5 00 feet on
highway and there is no evidence to the contrary.

the
hethe
the

Officer Iba testified as follows:

ceQ. Now, when you arrived, what direction
did you come from?
uA. I came from the south. I was heading
north.

ceQ. In the same direction that the plaintiff was
going, is that right?
ccA. Yes, sir.

ceQ. Did you see some clearance lights on the
truck?
uA. I don't recall.
ceQ. All right. Did you at any time?
ccA. When I arrived there, I checked the truck
to seeceQ. All right. Let me a~k you this: As you
came up from the south, in this direction (indicating) , did you have any trouble seeing the truck?
ccA. No, sir, no trouble.
ceQ. All right. You knew right where the accident was, didn't you?
ccA. Yes, sir.
ceQ. And there are some railroad tracks back
here (indicating) aren't there?
((A. There's railroad tracks at 2200, I believe,
south on State. There's about three, three tracks.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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((Q. That go across the street.
uA. Yes, sir.
uQ. That would be somewhere down in this
area (indicating) ?
uA. Yes, sir.
uQ. Roughly speaking. What is the lighting on
that street?
uA. It's well lit. It has the lights that burn till
daylight every morning.
uQ. Sodium vapor lights are they not?
uA. Yes, sir.
uQ. And tell me, there is a gas station across the
street from there, isn't there?
((A. Yes, sir.
uQ. There's a restaurant just ahead of it aways.
uA. Yes, sir.
uQ. Isn't there also a motel right near where
the accident happened?
uA. There's a motel between the accident and
the New China, I believe.
uQ. Yes. In other words, somewhere in here
(indicating) .
uA. Yes. And there's another motel across the
street to the west.
uQ. Over here (indicating).
uA. Yes.
ceQ. And then there's a gas station here (indicating).
uA. Wasatch Avenue, in between the motel
and the station.
uQ. Is that a rather fully lighted gas station?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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uA. It's open all night.
((Q. Now, up this direction is 21st South, is
that right?
((A. Yes, sir.
((Q. Is that a well lighted intersection?
((A. Fairly well. lt'suQ. I take it, then, that the visibility is good in
that area.
((A. Well, it's-it's good visibility. I meanuQ. It's well lighted.
((A. It was stormy that night. I mean, it had
been raining but((Q. But the visibility was good?
nA. The visibility was all right.
((Q. And when you arrived at the scene of that
accident, you made an observation, as you have previously said. The truck had clearance lights burning
on rear and side.
uA. That's, that's what I have on here, so that
must have been the way it was.
((Q. Well, as you recall it, there isn't any question, is there?
((A. No." (Tr. 32-34).

((Q. Mr. Iba, just one or two more questions.
When you arrived at the scene of the accident that
night, you walked around in front of the truck first
to see if anyone was hurt, it that right?
((A. Yes.
nQ. You saw nothing, is that correct?
nA. Nothing.
((Q. It was light enough for you to see in front
of the truck, wasn't it?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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teA. Yes, sir.
teQ. And, as a matter of fact, isn't it true that
in the very near vicinity of this truck, where it was
parked, was a sodium vapor light (indicating)?
etA. I believe it's up ahead.
((Q. Just up ahead of it?
teA. (Witness nods head in the affirmative.)
((Q. And also one to the rear, from where you
measured to the light pole, isn't it?
etA. I can't remember.
etQ. But at any rate, there was a light hanging
over and close to that truck, just ahead of it.
And, Mr. Iba, from the observations you made
that night, from what you have seen, in consideration of the weather and everything else, would you
say you could see at least 500 feet ahead while you
were driving down the street?
teA. Well, I would say you'd have clear visibility of the street with the lighting.
etQ. Yes. And, as a matter of fact, an object as
big as that truck, you could have seen it 500 feet
away whether it was lighted or not, couldn't you?
etA. Possibly." (Tr. 40-41)
Finnegan, the passenger in the car riding in the back
seat, also testified as to visibility and places the ability to
see traffic on 21st South a distance of 1200 feet away.
etQ. When you were riding in the back of the
truck, or in the back of the automobile, you said
you had the six packs of beer on the right-hand of
you, is that right?
teA. Right here on the right-hand side. (Indicating.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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uQ. And you were looking at the semaphore on
21st South?
uA. Looking at the traffic going by there. No
semaphore. There was traffic lights going by there.
ceQ. Down on 21st South?
uA. 21st South, traffic.
ceQ. That's about three blocks, isn't it?
uA. No.
uQ. Well, measured in city blocks.
uA. I think it's about, maybe a block and a half
from the scene of the accident. Two blocks you can
:figure I was looking at them before he hit the truck.
uQ. That's about it, huh, about two blocks?
uA. Yes.
ceQ. Now, when you use (blocks,' are you using
the blocks down there, or what we normally call
as a city block?
ccA. Well, I go by the numbers. I think the
Trucking Service is around 2200, or such a matter
there.
ceQ. 2200 would beccA. I imagine it would be something like 22,
2300, somewhere in there." (Tr. 79-80)

****
ceQ. So then you are talking about a :figure of
maybe a thousand, twelve hundred feet away.
ccA. Well, I know that territory there.
ceQ. You were looking at a point or distance
down on 21st South, approximately 1200 feet away,
down in this area (indicating)?
((A. Yah." (Tr. 80-81)
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POINT II.
THE PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF
RIDING WITH THE DRIVER HARWARD.
The Court properly held that the plaintiff assumed
the risk in this case. Without stressing the intoxication of
the defendant Harward, we submit that the intoxication
and actions of the plaintiff, the other passenger, and the
activities that night were adequately established by the
record. Officer Iba took 35 or 40 cans of beer from the car.
(Tr. 19). They had been drinking all evening and the
testimony of Finnegan is conclusive as well as providing
some measure of humor. He testified on cross-examination
while being confronted with his deposition previously
g1ven.
uA. That's right.
uMR. AADNESEN: On Pages, line 6. (Reading) (Question: You didn't actually keep a count of
the number of beers you had?
cAnswer: No, but it was a period of about three
hours. I would say we consumed, maybe, oh, maybe
about eight beers, or ten, in the period of three
hours.'
uis that about right?
uA. Six, eight, ten, I don't count them.
uQ. Now, you say Mr. Milligan's condition was
just fine. You've testified to that. Nothing wrong
with him.
uA. His condition?
uQ. YesuA. Yes.
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HQ. And you drank drink for drink with him,
except he had, what, about three more? Isn't that
what you said?
HA. No, I didn't say he had three more. I say I
believe I consumed just as many as he did, or Coy
either.
HQ. And so if there was anything wrong with
him, there would have been with you?
HA. That's right.
HQ. You can drink about the same amount he
can, can't you?
HA. If I don't drink anything else.
HQ. Well, you two have been out drinking
before. You know what capacity he has, don't you?
ccA. Drank beer.
HQ. I say, you have been drinking before with
Mr. Milligan; you are friends.
HA. Oh, yes, I've drank with Mr. Milligan
before.
HQ. And there have been times when you have
gotten a little under the weather. So you know how
much it takes, don't you?
HA. Oh, yes. Yes. Yes. I'll say that, yes.
HQ. And would you say that the two of you
drink about the same; it takes about the same
amount before you have any problem, like intoxication?
HA. Well, as far as beer is concerned, I'll tell
you the truth, I don't have any problem with beer
at all.
HQ. Do you drink enough of it to know that?
HA. Yes, I do.
HQ. Would it be your testimonyv
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((A. I've consumed a lot more beer than that
ever would, I'll promise you that.
((Q. Would it be your testimony you have
never been drunk on beer?
((A. That I've been drunk on beer?
((Q. Yes.

((A. You can get stupid on beer, if you get
overloaded, I'll say that, yes.
((Q. What's the difference between (stupid' and
cdrunk'?
((A. There's a Iotta difference. When you're
drinking 3.2 beer, then you're drinking something
else that's real hard, why, there's a lot of difference
between being stupid and drunk.

((Q. What's the (stupid'?
((A. I guess it puts you in a daze, as far as I
know.
((Q. Puts you in a kind of a daze, so you
couldn't see plainly?
((A. If you were drunk, yes.
ceQ. Now, you'd never drive a car in that condition, would you?
ccA. No. Nobody else would.
ceQ. You wouldn't get in the same car, would
you?
ccA.No.

ceQ. And you wouldn't expect Mr. Milligan to?
ccA. No.
ceQ. Have you ever discussed that?
ccA. Sure, we've often discussed it. I wouldn't
get in with anybody, driving a car, that's drunk.
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uQ. And especially if they had been drinking
beer, and were stupid instead of just drunk?
uA. If they were drinking beer, and I thought
they were anywhere's near intoxicated, I wouldn't
get in the car; or stupid, either.
uQ. How many times have you had eight or ten
beers in a period of-or eight or ten beers, plus two
or three beers, in a period of three hours? Do that
often?
uA. How many?
uQ. Yes. Do that often?
((A. Well, yes. When you entertain yourself, I
think if you go in and you don't even play, you can
sit at the bar there and you can consume a beer in
ten or fifteen minutes. I don't say you can't. If
you're a real lush, why, you probably would consume a dozen.
uQ. Well, now, what is your definition of a
lush?
((A. Well, a lush is a heavy drinker.
uQ. I see. And if a person were a lush, you
could consume about twelve beers, as I understand
it, in a period of three hours?
((A. Oh, yes. Yes. I'd say yes.
ttQ. You wouldn't do that unless you were a
lush, is that right?
ttA. No, I don't think you would.
uQ. Mr. Finnegan, let's go back over this.
Your testimony today is, and your testimony that
you testified before to was that you had a beer,
which is about a glass and a half, at dinner time. Is
that right?
((A. Well, can.
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((Q. Yes. Then you had a few beers, two or
three, while you were waiting for Mr. Harward,
and that was at about ten o'clock at night, ten or
ten-thirty is your testimony. Then when you
played, started playing, you had eight or ten more.
Do you consider yourself a lush?
((A. No, I don't consider myself a lush." (Tr.
89-92)
Mr. Finnegan also testified that he was thrown out
through the back door of the car as a result of the impact
and that while on the ground in back of the truck he could
see that the car was in the traveled portion of the road.
The record shows that the police removed Mr. Finnegan
from the back seat of the car and much to Mr. Finnegan's
amazement, there was no back door on the car as it was a
1954 Chevrolet two-door, not a four-door automobile.
((BY MR. AADNESEN:
uQ. What kind of a car did you say you were
driving, Mr. Harward?
((A. It's a '54 Chev. Del Rey, two-door.
ceQ. That's a two-door, isn't it?
uA. Yes.

((Q. Doesn't have any rear doors in it.
((A. No, sir.
((Q. You have to climb in through the front
seat?
ccA. That is right.
ceQ. The testimony that you have heard given
by Mr. Finnegan, that he was thrown out of the
rear door, is impossible, isn't it?
ccA. Well, he was still in the car when I was
taken out, sir.
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(tQ. Yes. You never saw him on the ground
anywhere, did you?
(tA. No, I didn't.
(tQ. And he was there, in behind the seat, all
the time, wasn't he?
(tA. He was at the time I was calling for help
across the street.
(tQ. And that was until the officers took you
all out.
uA. That is right. I was first out of the car."
(Tr. 146)
Here again the Court adequately summarized the
testimony.
((THE COURT: Both the Plaintiff Milligan
and Mr. Finnegan, who were riding with Harward
in his car at the time of the accident, knew Mr.
Harward well. They had been with him considerable
time in the early part of the night, playing pool
with him, talking with him, and drinking beer with
him. There are some differences in the statements of
the three of them as to the amount of beer they
drank that evening; but it isn't the amount of beer
you drink, it's the effect of it, or the possible effect.
((Finnegan said, (Of course, Harward was
you drink, it's the effect of it, or the possible effect.
drunk, was intoxicated.' The other guest said he
didn't think Harward was intoxicated. But both of
them knew Harward, they knew he had been drinking all evening with them, drink for drink. They
go and get into his car with him knowing that he's
drinking intoxicants, and knowing that that involves the risk expressly so provided by the statute.
And the statute says that a person who does that
assumes the risk of bad driving; and that if he were
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driving in the car as a guest, he has the right and
privilege, and should exercise it, to warn and caution the driver who has been drinking. Under those
situations, the statute says the guest cannot assert
a claim and recover a claim against the driver. And
there is no dispute but what both Milligan and Finnegan were just guests in the car.
ccso from that angle, that should dispose of the
case." (Tr. 200-201)
((Now, Milligan, the plaintiff, and Finnegan,
the other guest in the car, had been with Harward
a long time that evening, playing pool with him,
drinking with him, over quite a period of time.
They say they had all drank about the same rate
and the same quantity. They were acquainted with
Harward, they knew him, they knew his drinking
habits; they knew he drank quite freely, especially
with beer, and beer is an intoxicating liquor under
the statute. They knew what he had been drinking
that night, because they were with him, drinking
with him. They knew as a matter of law that any
man who drank that much beer in that much time
is under the influence of intoxicating liquor; that
it's unlawful for him to drive an automobile. So the
statute says if you get yourself in that kind of a
position, and get hurt by it, you have no relief
against the owner of the car. You know the danger
you are going into, and you shouldn't encourage it,
you should frown away from it and protect yourself." (Tr. 203-204)
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the Court properly ruled

in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff and not
one shred of evidence exists in the record at any place to
support the contentions of the plaintiff against the defendants, Kenneth B. McDuffy and C. E. Lindsey.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
GRANT C. AADNESEN,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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